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The literature on project governance suggests an association between good governance and project success.
However, the mechanism is not known. It is suggested governance and governmentality influence six psycho-
logical constructs, and through them, decision making, and project performance. The six constructs are culture,
decision architecture, naturalistic decision making, group working, identity, and social representation. We review
six case studies to explore the link between governmentality and governance and the six constructs, and their
influence on decision making and project performance. Secondary data were used, using six previously published
case studies. We find the six constructs influence decision making and project performance. Thus, we confirm
earlier research, to suggest that good governance does often lead to improved project performance and the link is
via decision making. Governance creates an environment in which good decisions can be made on projects and
assigns competent people to leadership positions.1. Introduction
Turner (2020) conducted a survey of papers on project gov-
ernmentality and governance published between 2014 and the present in
the three main project management journals: the International Journal of
Project Management; the Project Management Journal; and the Inter-
national Journal of Managing Projects in Business. Several papers suggest
good governance is associated with good project performance, but the
mechanismwhich creates the link is not known. Turner (2020) suggested
the link may be via good decision making. He proposed that governance
may influence six psychological constructs, and they in turn would in-
fluence decision making and thence project performance. The six psy-
chological constructs are: culture; decision architecture; naturalistic
decision making; group working; identity; and social representation. The
research model is shown in Fig. 1. The six psychological constructs are
defined in Table 1. Also shown are key elements identified by Turner
(2020). The six constructs were identified through discussion with
Reader (2019).
We need to be careful. Correlation does not necessarily imply
causation. Turner (2020) was investigating where governance influences
the six constructs, and they influence decision making and thence project
performance. However, MacCormick (2019) says that sometimes
governance influences culture and sometimes culture influencesr.j.turner1@leeds.ac.uk.
September 2020; Accepted 22 S
er Ltd. This is an open access articgovernance. We will find later with one of the case studies we study that
poor organizational culture causes poor governmentality and also poor
decision making and thence poor project performance. So poor gover-
nance is correlated with poor performance but does not cause it. Turner
also identified that the authors he reviewed sometimes suggest that
governance is a moderating variable, as shown in Fig. 1, so governance
might moderate the relationship between the six constructs and decision
making, or decision making and project performance.
In this paper we review six case studies, to explore the relationship
between governmentality and governance and the six psychological
constructs, to identify how the constructs influence decision making on
projects, and how governmentality and governance influence project
performance. The research questions explored in this paper are:
RQ1: How do governance and governmentality and the six psycho-
logical constructs interact with each other?
RQ2: How do the six psychological constructs influence decision
making on projects and thence project performance?
RQ3:How do good governmentality and governance lead to improved
project performance?
We define governance and governmentality on projects. We then
introduce the methodology. The fourth section describes the six caseeptember 2020
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
Fig. 1. Research model.
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conclusions.
2. Governance
Based on Müller (2017, 2019a), Turner (2020 gave a clear definition
of four levels of the governance of project management:
1. Governmentality, (Dean 2010, see Table 2),
2. The board, often called the governance of project management,
(APM, 2004),
3. The project context, including project programs, portfolios and net-
works, often called the governance of projects,
4. The project, often called project governance
Governmentality is strictly human agency, and the rest of governance
structure, Table 2, (Müller, 2019a), but Dean (2010) suggests gov-
ernmentality is the overarching mechanism from which governance
flows, so it is shown as the top level. The four levels together are often
called the governance of project management. For the rest of this paper,
we refer to governance covering the four levels.
The models for governmentality and governance used are due to
Müller, Zhai et al. (2016, 2017), Table 3. They use the three forms of
governmentality defined by Dean (2010): authoritarian; liberal;
neo-liberal. They also identify three precepts of governmentality:
emphasizing: organizational values; process adherence; and project
well-being. For governance they identify sovereignty, with three levels,
low, medium and high, mechanisms based on control or trust, and the
number of governance institutions as low, medium and high. They also
use the four governance paradigms defined by Müller (2009), based on
whether the organization optimises results just for the shareholders or a
wider range of stakeholders, and based on whether the organization
controls staff by behaviours or results.
3. Methodology
This is a conceptual paper, where we aim to use case studies to2
illustrate the concepts developed by Turner et al (2010). Six case studies
are reviewed: two computer projects; two construction projects; and two
organizational change projects, so we have two projects from each of the
three project types suggested by Müller and Turner (2007). We use sec-
ondary data, reviewing six previously published case studies. The author
had no role in writing any of the case studies. Three of the case studies
were readily available, (Turner et al., 2020). The first describes a failure,
and we were able to find a case describing the successful implementation
of that project output at a fourth attempt. That left us needing to find one
more construction project and one more organizational change project.
We searched through the International Journal of Project Management
back to (2010).
In each case study we focus on one or two decision. The six case
studies, and decisions reviewed are:
1. The first, second and third attempt at the computerisation of despatch
in the London Ambulance Service, LASCAD1, 2 and 3. The decision
focused on in LASCAD1 is the decision to cancel the project, in
LASCAD2 the decision to let the contract, and in LASCAD3 the deci-
sion to commission the project. These could be considered three
projects, but a) they failed for very similar reasons, and b) LASCAD2
and 3 can be considered to be the same project. In the month it should
have been commissioned, January 1992, LASCAD2 was failing, so it
was reconfigured with the same team, the same design and the same
contract, and the delivery date reset as the 26th October 1992.
2. The fourth and successful attempt at the computerisation of despatch
in the London Ambulance Service, LASCAD4, and one project within
what was now treated as a program, the computerisation of call
taking, CTAK. The decision focused on is the decision to create a
Golden Circle to deliver CTAK, and the use of prototyping within the
Golden Circle to develop the system.
3. The construction of the Amsterdam North-South Line, and the deci-
sion to change the governance structure from one where the project
was a contractor to the city council, with a principal agency rela-
tionship between them, to one where the contractor was a department
of the city council, working under a stewardship approach.
4. A Swedish rail tunnel, and the creation of the project organization
Table 1
The six psychological constructs.
Culture Observed behavioural regularities when people interact Schein and Schein (2017)
Three dimensions of organizational culture Artefacts Visible structures and processes Schein and Schein (2017)
Behaviour
Espoused beliefs Goals, values
Ideologies
Rationalizations
Basic understandings Unconscious beliefs influence behaviour




Choice architecture Governance should create an environment in which people make decisions in the best interest of the organization. Dolan et al. (2010)






Stakeholder vs shareholder school Müller, Turner et al.
(2014, 2016)
Outcome vs behaviour control Turner and Müller
(2017)
Naturalistic decision making How people make decisions in real-world contexts that are meaningful and familiar to them Lipshitz et al. (2001)
Characteristics Process orientation Lipshitz et al. (2001)
Situation-action matching
Context bound informal modelling
Empirically-based prescription
Situational awareness Perception of risk Endsley (1995)




Mental models Macrocognitive phenomenon Rouse and Morris (1985)
Mental simulation Crandal et al., 2006
Schemas of how things work
Identify workable solutions
Group working Two key ways decision-making in groups and teams can be improved: improving team working; supporting the
development of schemas and reducing occurrence of team biases
Haslam (2004)
















Identity Our sense of belonging to a group that leads to specific cognitive and behavioural responses Haslam (2004)
Belonging Cognitive – the group exists Tajfel (1982)
Evaluative – I want to be a member
Emotional – I like being a member




Roles Roles DeFillippi and Sydow (2016)
Responsibilities




A system of values, ideas and practices which establishes an order for individuals to orientate themselves and to enable
communication
Moscovici (1973)




Anchoring – discursive abilities
Objectification – process facilitators
Governance – social exchange Müller Pemsel et al., (2014,
2015)
Governmentality – social cohesion
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Table 2
Positioning governance, governmentality, management and leadership (after
Müller, 2019b),
Human Agency Structure
Steering Governmentality: The way
governors interact with those they
govern.
 Mentalities, rationalities, ways of
interaction
Ways chosen by those in
governance roles to implement,
maintain, and change the
governance structure
Governance: Framework for
managers to do work
 Structures, policies, processes
etc.
 Ways mangers are held
accountable for their work
Executing Leadership: People oriented
activity to accomplish project
objectives
Management: Goal and task-
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5. The implementation of Antibiotic Sustainability within nine Euro-
pean countries, and the two decisions a) to set achievable objectives
rather than a fanciful wish list, and b) the project start-up and
coordination.
6. The implementation of Customer Requirements Management in a
French telecommunications company, the decision to manage the
project as a PSO Project, (Andersen et al., 1987), and the roll-out of
the project.
4. The cases
The six case studies are described in this section. Secondary data were
used, the six case studies having been previously published elsewhere.
4.1. LASCAD1, 2 and 3
The first project to be considered is the first three and failed attempts
at the computerisation of despatch at London Ambulance Service, (Bey-
non-Davies, 1995; Dalcher, 2010). The London Ambulance Service (LAS)
is the largest in the world and is ten times larger than the next largest in
the UK. In the mid-1980s, the Operational Research Consultancy
(ORCON) introduced a new standard for the performance of ambulance
services. This required the issue of instructions to an ambulance within 3
min of the receipt of a call, and for the ambulance to arrive at the scene
after no more than 14 min. LAS was unable to meet these requirements. It
was therefore decided to create a computer aided dispatch system (CAD).
Between 1986 and 1996, four attempts were made. The first three failed;
the third resulted in the total failure of the system after commissioning,
and the service was immobilized for a day while the manual system was
reintroduced. It is believed between 23 and 46 people may have died as a
result.
The first attempt was intended to computerize call receipt and
dispatch but was extended to include vehicle location without a change
to the time or budget. After a year’s delay, the project was started in May
1987, and was expected to cost £2.5 million and take 3 years. It was
cancelled in October 1990, when it had cost £7.5 million and was at least
six months behind schedule. After the first attempt, the consultants,
Arthur Andersen, recommended a packaged solution for call receipt and
ambulance dispatch, and suggested it would cost £1.5 million, and take
19 months. It was decided to design and construct a more comprehen-
sive, bespoke system, but as is common in project management, the first
mentioned budget stuck. This is suggestive of anchoring, (Kahneman,
2012). Although such biases strictly only apply to individuals, Dror et al.
(2017) suggest they can cascade from one part of a project to another.
Also, it was planned the system would take just eight months to imple-
ment, less than half the time suggested by Arthur Andersen. Through
compulsory competitive bidding a vendor was chosen. The only bidder to
bid less than £1.5 million was a small software vendor with no previous
experience. The project started in May 1991, with planned commis-
sioning on 8th January 1992. The contract was awarded on 8th August
1991 and signed on 16th September 1991. Somewhat unsurprisingly the
delivery date was not met, so in January 1992 the project was recon-
figured. A delivery date of Monday 26th October 1992 was set. The sys-
tem was commissioned on this date despite no testing having been done,
and there being 81 known errors of which two were potentially fatal. The
system ceased to function on 4th November and the manual system had
to be re-implemented. That took a day, during which there was reduced
service. (See Beynon-Davies, 1995; Dalcher, 2010).
There was an authoritarian culture that led to authoritarian gov-
ernmentality. Culture influenced governmentality. MacCormick (2019)
suggests the influence can be either way. The authoritarian culture
influenced decision making in two ways, contributing to the project
failure. Weber and Hsee (2000) suggest culture will influence decision
making via behavioural norms, judgement norms, perception of risk and
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were for people to do as they were told, the judgement norms were to
suspend judgement and do as they were told, and no risk analysis and
management were done. There were also two group biases commonly
associated with authoritarian culture: group think and escalation of
commitment, (Jones & Roelofsma, 2000).
4.1.1. LASCAD1
The decision considered is the decision to cancel the project. There
had been escalation of commitment to the point where the project was six
months late and three times overspent. But suddenly it was cancelled
when the system failed a test. Dalcher (2010) does not say what caused
the sudden change of mind, so it is difficult to say what factors influenced
the cancellation. There had been escalation of commitment, but suddenly
enough was enough.
4.1.2. LASCAD2
I focus on the letting of the contract. There was a complete lack of
situational awareness, (Endsley, 1995). The first attempt was estimated
to cost £2.5 million, and was cancelled when £7.5 million had been spent.
Anderson Consulting had said a packaged solution could be done for £1.5
million. Even though they decided to go for a bespoke system, anchoring
meant the estimate for £1.5 million stuck. So contractors were told any
bid over £1.5 million would be non-compliant. Of the 35 companies that
expressed interest, 18 refused to bid. Of the 17 bids received, all but one
was over £1.5 million. The one bid under £1.5 million was from one of
the weakest bidders, a consortium of an inexperienced software supplier,
and a hardware supplier who was a reluctant member. When they won
the bid, because the software supplier had no assets, the reluctant
hardware supplier was made prime contractor. Doesn’t a little voice in
your ear say something is not quite right here? People had suspended
judgement. There were also issues of identity. Procurement was done by
the contracts department who did not understand the project, and were
just following rules. Also, there was poor governance, according to the
principles suggested by the OECD, (Millstein et al., 1998; Müller, 2017).
The process was not transparent, no one was accountable, the process
was not professional, and it was not fair on the contractors who made
sensible bids.
4.1.3. LASCAD3
I consider the decision to commission the system. Again there was a
complete failure of situational awareness, (Endsley, 1995). Consultants
were telling LAS the system would not work. It was not properly tested,
and there were 81 known errors of which two were potentially fatal. Yet,
the system was commissioned on Monday 26th October 1992, the date
that had been set nine months earlier when the project was reconfigured.
It failed absolutely 10 days later, on the 4th November 1992. Everything
suggested the system would not work, but it was commissioned, also
illustrating poor mental models, (Rouse and Morris, 1985). We also see
here group think and escalation of commitment, and the authoritarian
governmentality led to incorrect mental models with the suspension of
judgement.
4.2. LASCAD4
Following the third failure, there was a very scathing report into the
causes of failure, and the authoritarian culture that contributed to it,
(Page et al., 1993). As a result, the culture of LAS changed to become
more liberal, and a successful, fourth attempt made to deliver the system.
At the fourth attempt, LASCAD was managed as a program, (Dalcher,
2010), with parts of the system developed and delivered separately. The
outcome was a success and won awards, though Dalcher suggests it was
less than perfect. McGrath (2002) describes the delivery of the Call
Taking System, CTAK. At the time, the words governance and gov-
ernmentality were not used in the British public sector, but because of the
Page report, a liberal governmentality was adopted, resulting in medium5
sovereignty, (Beynon-Davies, 1995).
McGrath (2002) describes how for CTAK a “Golden Circle” was
created, and the team isolated within it, to protect them from vested
interests which it was felt had contributed to the failure of LASCAD1, 2
and 3. It is interesting because in project history there are cases where
isolating the project from stakeholders led to failure because the stake-
holders were not engaged, and other cases where isolating the project
from vested interests led to success because the team were able to focus
on what they were doing, (Turner, 2014). This was a case of the latter.
Within the Golden Circle there was neo-liberal governmentality, so there
was a liberal culture outside the Golden Circle, and a neo-liberal culture
inside it.
The call taking systemwas developed by the Golden Circle. They took
an iterative approach, identifying four possible solutions and prototyping
two. The final solution was negotiated with 300 users within Golden
Circle. They illustrated naturalistic decision making and strong situa-
tional awareness. Through the prototypes they matched action to the
situation, did context bound informal modelling and empirical matching.
They also had mental models of why the failures occurred in the past and
what would work in the future. Within the Golden Circle, the 300 call
taking staff working on prototypes, had a strong sense of identity. They
wanted to be part of the process and valued working within the shared
space. Staff members supported each other, enabling communication.
People were tied to their identities which stopped other alliances form-
ing. This also seduced people into an alliance and defined rules of
engagement. The Golden Circle became an example of what Latour
(1999) labelled a factish, which combines real knowledge (facts) and
powerful beliefs (fetishes). A factish provides a mixture of artefacts be-
liefs and values from the top two levels of the lily pond model of culture,
(Schein and Schein, 2017). A factish is constructed and holds people
together. When Golden Circle was conceived as a factish rules of
engagement were neither wholly mysterious nor entirely rational. The
rules were worked out as the prototyping progressed and the solution
adopted in a form of satisficing (Simon, 1956),
4.3. Amsterdam North-south metro line
The first construction project is the Amsterdam North-South Metro
line, (Staal-Ong and Westerweld, 2010). There the decision we focus on
is the decision to change the governance structure. Under the original
governance structure, the project was a contractor to the city council,
working under a principal-agency relationship. The relationship with
external stakeholders (the people of Amsterdam) was managed by the
principal, the city council. This did not work. The board decided to
change governance structure, whereby the project became a department
within the city council, working under a stewardship relationship, and
the project nowmanaged the relationship with the external stakeholders.
Under the new governance structure, the governmentality became
neo-liberal. The project became more responsible for its own self-
management, but also the relationship with the people of Amsterdam
became a greater focus. The Dutch culture had a significant impact on the
project. The Dutch people tend to be very vocal in their opinions, so
changing the responsibility for managing the relationship to within the
project enabled a change from management of stakeholders to manage-
ment for stakeholders, (Huemann et al., 2016), and even to management
with stakeholders, (Derakhshan et al., 2019). Looking after the health,
safety and welfare of the people of Amsterdam became significant under
a program called BLVC, standing for the Dutch Bereikbaarheid, Leef-
baarheid, Veiligheid and Communiatie, (accessibility, liveability, safety
and communication). This also had an impact on behavioural norms,
judgement norms, risk analysis and risk management. Identity was a
significant issue on this project, with the responsibility for stakeholder
management. Under the new governance structure roles, responsibilities
and authorities for managing the relationship with the extremal stake-
holders was much clearer. Further, the four principles of governance
suggested by the OECD, (Millstein et al., 1998; Müller, 2017),
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effectively applied under the new governance structure. Finally there was
good situational awareness. The project was very much aware the impact
the stakeholders can have on project success. Staal-Ong and Westerweld
(2010) suggest success can depend on things outside the control of the
project manager, and here the project was aware that success was
dependent on the acceptance of the people of Amsterdam. Thus it was
recognised the importance of changing the identity, that is the re-
sponsibility for the management of the relationship with the external
stakeholders from the City council as principal under the old governance
structure, to the project as steward, and now a department of the city
council, under the new governance structure.
4.4. Swedish rail tunnel
The second construction project is a rail tunnel in Sweden, (Eriksson
and Kadefors, 2017). The decision I wish to consider here is the creation
of the project organization structure. Here there was different gov-
ernmentality at different levels of the management hierarchy. Gov-
ernmentality for the relationship of the project director to the board was
neo-liberal. The project director was effectively an entrepreneur, creating
the project and the project organization. He was in total control of the
project. However, as he rolled governmentality down to lower levels of
the project, it became liberal. Eriksson and Kadefors (2017) suggest
biases and heuristics played a part in the creation of the project organi-
zation. Heuristics are short cut rules or rules of thumb people apply to
help them make decisions, (Kahneman, 2012). Applying heuristics re-
duces the cognitive effort but can lead to effective solutions. In particular,
Eriksson and Kadefors invoke anchoring, availability and familiarity
heuristics, (Kahneman, 2012), meaning people select alternatives that
are familiar to them. They also invoke satisficing, (Simon, 1956),
meaning that once people have found a solution that works, they do not
seek a more optimal one. The psychology literature suggests that heu-
ristics apply to individuals, not groups, (Kahneman, 2012). Individuals
apply heuristics to simplify their decision-making processes, not groups,
although I did cite above Dror et al. (2017) who suggest that biases can
cascade from one part of the groups to another. Thus when the project
director choses the project organization structure, he may apply heuris-
tics, and his biases may cascade to other people in the organization,
working under a liberal governmentality. However, we can also suggest
that the choice of the project organizations was based on mental models,
(Rouse and Morris, 1985). Based on previous experience, the project
members, including the project director, had mental models of project
organizations structures that would work. Eriksson and Kadefors (2017)
suggest that research on innovation and knowledge management
emphasise the use of meta-routines or dynamic capabilities for selecting
operating routines, so also suggest the use of mental models. Regardless
of whether metal models or heuristics were applied to select the project
organization structure, satisficing occurred. Once an organization struc-
ture that worked had been implemented, no attempt was made to find a
more optimal structure. However, the author of this paper is a believer of
the saying by Voltaire and Arouet (1764), “The perfect is the enemy of
the good”. That is why heuristics can lead to effective decision, we apply
a solution that works, rather than achieve nothing while we seek
perfection. The choice of project organization also illustrated good situ-
ational awareness, (Endsley, 1995), choosing a solution that worked in
the context.
4.5. ABS international
The first organizational change project is the implementation of
antibiotic sustainability, (ABS), in nine European countries, (Gareis and
Frank, 2010). The overall aim of this project was to develop ABS pro-
cedures and measures for the nine European countries, to prepare and
develop a training program for each country and to train trainers and
consultants, and to develop a network of experts. There were also two6
governmentality approaches on this project. The project manager
working within her uncle’s consulting company was subject to liberal
governmentality. She was controlled by results and had decision making
responsibility, but had to conform to the process of the consulting com-
pany. On the other hand, for the people working in the nine countries,
there was a neo-liberal governmentality. They were acting as entrepre-
neurs in each of their counties. A key thing about this project was the
objectives were set as things which could be achieved. Rather than being
a vacuous wish list of ideals, the objectives were carefully framed tomake
them achievable. I reacted cynically to this when I first read the case,
thinking that aspiration had been curtailed to enable the project team to
say they had achieved their objectives on completion. But the approach
was the correct thing to do. Gareis and Frank (2010, p334) quote the
European Union guidance notes in saying:
The specific objectives are concrete statements describing what the
project is trying to achieve to reach its general objective. They should be
matched to the problem determinants identified in the problem analysis,
and should be written at a level which allows them to be evaluated at the
conclusion of the project. They should also be specific, measurable,
acceptable for the target group, realistic and time-bound.
A general objective is a general indication of the project’s contribu-
tion to society in terms of its longer-term benefits. The general objective
has to correlate with the different specific objectives.
The project put considerable effort into the processes of team for-
mation and maintenance, (Reader et al., 2009). There was a start-up
workshop to define the task, and the norms, characteristics, and atti-
tudes of people working on the project. There was a coordination process
to provide leadership, communication between the project team mem-
bers, and to coordinate decision. Because the objectives had been care-
fully defined, the goals were achieved, creative solutions were delivered,
and the team members felt satisfaction at what they had achieved. The
wellbeing of the team was supported, as well as the wellbeing of ABS in
the nine countries. Social representation, (Moscovici, 2000), was signif-
icant on this project. Communication was important, and that was ach-
ieved through regular meetings as well as on-line communication. Group
dynamics was also coordinated in this way. Team members had a strong
social identity as implementers in their respective countries, which also
gave them a significant social position, which had to be developed. Team
members were to be facilitators for the implementation process in their
countries. Governmentality had to create a strong social cohesion be-
tween the project team members. They would all work on their own in
their respective countries, but with the support of the network of people
doing similar things in nine countries. Further, governance had to enable
social exchanges, which was achieved through the start-up process, the
regular team meetings and the in-line communication. The team mem-
bers also identified strongly with the team, they recognised the impor-
tance of the project, wanted to be part of it, and enjoyed their
involvement. Finally, the four OECD principles of good governance,
transparency, accountability responsibility and fairness, (Millstein et al.,
1998; Müller, 2017), were visibly applied.
4.6. CRM implementation
The last case study and the second organizational change projects is
the implementation of a Customer Requirements Management System
(CRM) in a French telecommunications company, (Beldi et al., 2010).
This may appear to be another IT project, but it was managed as an
organizational change project. Indeed, LASCAD should have been
managed as an organizational change project, and following the Page
report, (Page et al., 1993), managing the organizational change became
part of the program to implement the system at the fourth attempt.
Andersen, Grude, Haug and Turner (1987) introduced the concept of a
PSO project. They suggested that during the implementation of the
computer system, changes need to be made to the people of the organi-
zation, the business processes (systems) and the organization structure
itself. Beldi et al. (2010) quote some Rip vanWinkles who discovered this
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as a PSO Project, social cohesion, (Moscovici, 2000), became significant
again. Governmentality had to ensure social cohesion and governance
social exchange. People responsible for roll-out had to identify with the
project and the changes required, and they had a special social position
within the organization. Communication was important and group dy-
namics needed to be managed. Interestingly, again there was different
governmentality for different parts of the project. The project team itself
worked under a neo-liberal governmentality. They were operating as
entrepreneurs, defining the system and PSO changes to be made, piloting
it and managing the roll out. However, the roll-out itself had to be much
more strictly managed. Perhaps authoritarian governmentality would be
prefeed, but then it is highly likely that the people responsible for roll-out
would not be committed to it, so a liberal governmentality was adopted
for roll-out. But we see here, the nature of the project drove the gov-
ernmentality. The people responsible did identify with it very strongly
and were highly committed. Finally, the CRM system changed the choice
architecture for the company. The new system matched an EAST
framework, (Dolan et al., 2010). It was Easy to use and Attractive to the
users. The implementation followed a suggestion of Turner (2004) to
make the new system initially match the old system, and then make
improvements with time. Also, the Stakeholders were well managed, and
the implementation was Timely.
5. Discussion
Turner (2020) suggested that governance might influence the six
psychological constructs, and that those in turn would influence decision
making. In this section we review what the six case studies tell us about
that relationship.
5.1. Multiple governmentality and governance
Four of the case studies have multiple governmentality or governance
structures. In LASCAD4, following the Page report (1993), liberal gov-
ernmentality was adopted for the organization as a whole. But within the
Golden Circle neo-liberal governmentality was adopted. The project team
worked as entrepreneurs, developing and testing prototypes. On the
Swedish rail tunnel, the project director had neo-liberal governmentality
in his relationship with the parent organization. But as he rolled it down
to lower levels, he changed it to liberal governmentality. ABS interna-
tional was the reverse. The project manager’s relationship with the
parent organization, (the consultancy she worked for), was liberal, but as
she rolled it out to the sub-projects working in the nine countries it
changed to neo-liberal. In the CRM implementation, the project team
developing the new system, the business processes and changed orga-
nization structure was subject to neo-liberal governmentality, but for
roll-out they changed it to liberal. Turner (2014) suggests that the culture
should change from democratic to autocratic as the project moves from
design to execution, which suggests that the governmentality for roll-out
might be autocratic. But liberal governmentality was necessary to ach-
ieve buy-in from the people responsible for roll-out. In the literature on
governance reviewed by Turner (2020), there is no mention of multiple
governmentalities on projects, and Müller (2019b) confirms there has
been little consideration of it. Turner (2014) suggests the culture of a
project changes as it progresses through different stages, to reflect the
needs of the different stages, and that is what we have seen here. The
changing governmentality reflects different working relationships in the
team, and that influences the nature of decisionmaking on different parts
of the project.
5.2. Culture
Turner (2020) originally suggested governmentality and governance
would set culture, but then quoted MacCormick (2019) who suggested
that governance influences formal culture but informal culture influences7
governance. On LASCAD1, 2 & 3, culture set governmentality. Following
the Page report (1993), liberal governmentality was adopted for the or-
ganization, and that changed the culture, (though the word gov-
ernmentality was not widely used in the British public sector in the early
1990s). On the Amsterdam North South Line, the governance was
changed to change the culture from one based on control to one based on
trust. That also changed the nature of the relationship with the external
stakeholders. On the other three projects, governmentality influenced the
culture, but governmentality, governance and culture were suited to the
needs of the project.
Weber and Hsee (2000) suggest that culture influences behavioural
norms, judgement norms, risk assessment and risk management. On
LASCAD 2 & 3, the authoritarian culture meant that project personnel
suspended judgement and did as they were told. There was also little risk
assessment or management. On the other five projects, liberal or
neo-liberal governmentality, and the associated culture, meant that be-
haviours and judgement were more suited to the needs of the project.
Risk analysis and management was done on several of them. Müller, Zhai
et al. (2016, 2017) suggest that with liberal governmentality some de-
cision making is delegated to project managers, and decision are taken on
economic principles. With neo-liberal governmentality, project managers
act as entrepreneurs with significant freedom, and decisions are taken to
maximise organizational values. With liberal governmentality there is
management of stakeholders, whereas with neo-liberal governmentality
there is management for stakeholders, (Huemann et al., 2016), and even
management with stakeholders, (Derakhshan et al., 2019).
5.3. Decision architecture
With the two organizational change projects, ABS International and
the CRM implementation, there was somemove towardsmaking decision
making easy, attractive and social and timely, (Dolan et al., 2010). With
ABS international, the people working in the nine countries had to
develop ABS principles and procedures for their countries, and training
programs. The start-up and running of the project were designed to
facilitate that. With the CRM implementation, the CRM system itself was
designed to be familiar to users, and so to be attractive and easy to use, to
support their subsequent decision making.
5.4. Naturalistic decision-making
Naturalistic decision making, and the associated topics of situational
awareness and mental models, is not something widely considered by the
project management literature, but was significant in several of the case
studies. Endsley (1995, p36) defines situational awareness as:
… the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the
projection of their status in the near future.
whereas Rouse and Morris (1985, p7) define mental models as:
… mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of
systems purpose and form, explanation of systems functioning and
observed system states and predictions of future states.
Situation awareness is where we predict the future from our obser-
vations of the current state, whereas mental models are where we predict
the future from our schemata about how the current state is likely evolve.
On LASCAD2 & 3, there was a complete lack of situational awareness.
The decision to let the contract to the only contractor deemed compliant,
and the decision to commission the system showed a lack of awareness of
the nature of the situation. On LASCAD4, the prototyping showed the
matching of actions to the situation, and mental models of how the sys-
tem would evolve, based at least in part on knowledge of what failed in
LASCAD3. The Swedish rail tunnel showed mental models of what or-
ganization structures had previously worked, and what was likely to
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impact of stakeholders on the project. ABS International also required the
matching of actions to situations in the nine countries.
5.5. Group working
We consider two elements, team formation and maintenance and
group biases.
5.5.1. Team formation and maintenance
Reader et al. (2009) developed team performance frameworks to
better understand the performance of groups and teams in high risk in-
dustries. They include inputs, processes and outputs, Table 2. ABS In-
ternational illustrates all three steps, through the start-up workshop, the
coordination procedures, and the careful definition of the project ob-
jectives to achieve a successful outcome. Similar processes may have
been followed on the other five projects, but they are not overtly
mentioned. On the implementation of CRM in the French telecommu-
nications company, team formation of the roll-out teams was carefully
managed. Similarly within the Golden Circle on LASCAD4, team forma-
tion was well managed.
5.5.2. Group biases
Jones & Roelofsma (2000) suggest groups can suffer four biases: false
consensus; group think; polarization; and escalation of commitment.
Please note, that the biases and heuristics described by Kahneman (2012)
are suffered by individuals, whereas the four here are suffered by groups,
though escalation of commitment is related to sunk cost bias. Jones &
Roelofsma (2000) say that group think in particular can occur where
there is an authoritarian culture, and is associated with loss of situational
awareness. We saw group think on LASCAD2 & 3, with elements of false
consensus and polarization. On LASCAD1 we saw escalation of
commitment, though that suddenly disappeared. The cause was given as
the failure of a test, though the reason behind the evaporation of the bias
is not discussed. The final commissioning on LASCAD 3 was also esca-
lation of commitment.
5.6. Identity
Identity was important in several of the projects.
In the letting of the contract LASCAD2, as is common, responsibility
for letting the contract was in the procurement department, divorced
from the project. The people involved adhered to the estimate given by
Arthur Anderson, which in fact was not relevant. The process also did not
adhere to the OECD’s four principles of governance, (Millstein et al.,
1998; Müller, 2017): transparency, accountability, responsibility and
fairness. In particular, making the bids that exceeded the impossible es-
timate non-compliant was very unfair, and of course contributed to the
failure of LASCAD2 and 3.
On LASCAD4, people recognised the Golden Circle as something they
wanted to join and liked being in. McGrath (2002) also says that the Page
report identified responsibilities for key actors, and defined mutually
reinforcing identifies linked to the corporate plan.
On the Amsterdam North-South line, the governance structure was
changed to better achieve the OECD’s four principles of good gover-
nance, (Millstein et al., 1998; Müller, 2017): transparency, account-
ability, responsibility and fairness. Responsibility for managing the
relationship with the people of Amsterdamwas alsomoved to the project,
to create better relationships. The BLVC process, (Bereikbaarheid, Leef-
baarheid, Veiligheid and Communicatie), was also better handled by the
project to create better relationships.
On the two organizational change projects, the teams responsible for
implementation wanted to be part of the project, because they believed in
the importance of the deliverables. So they recognised the project as
something they wanted to join and liked being in. On ABS International,
the start-up process helped, but the fact that the project was sponsored by8
the European Union also helped, as did the recognition of the importance
of ABS. On the CRM project, the project created a model for the imple-
mentation of the project that people believed would work, and would be
beneficial for the company, and so the wanted to be part of it.
5.7. Social representation
On the two organizational change projects, ABS International and the
CRM implementation, social representation was very important. It was
important to help orientate people to the needs of the project and create
communication between them. As we saw above, and identity was
created where people wanted to belong to the project. People were given
appropriate social positions which facilitated group dynamics. Gover-
nance facilitated social exchange and governmentality facilitated social
cohesion. The same to an extent is also true for the Golden Circle on
LASCAD4.
On the Amsterdam North-South Line, the change to the governance
structure changed the identity of the project to being part of the City
Council, which change the social position and group dynamics of the
project. It also facilitated communication with the external stakeholders
and created social exchange and social cohesion. It also created objecti-
fication, facilitating the process for the implementation of the BLVC
process.
6. Conclusion
Turner (2020) showed that the project governance literature suggests
that good governance is associated with project success, but also said that
the mechanism linking the two was not known. Turner suggested that
perhaps good governance leads to better decision making via the six
psychological constructs, governance, decision architecture, naturalistic
decision making, group behaviour, identity and social representation,
and better decision-making leads to better project performance. In this
paper we investigated six case studies to investigate the link between
project governmentality and governance, the six psychological con-
structs, project decision-making and project performance. The three
research questions are:
RQ1: How do governance and governmentality and the six psycho-
logical constructs interact with each other.
RQ2: How do the six psychological constructs influence decision
making on projects and thence project performance
RQ3:How do good governmentality and governance lead to improved
project performance?
Answering RQ1, governmentality and governance do interact with
the six psychological constructs. Sometimes governmentality and
governance influence the construct and so cause better project perfor-
mance. But other times, the construct influences governmentality and
governance, and so although good governmentality and governance are
associated with better (or worse) project performance, they do not cause
it. On LASCAD1, 2 and 3, the authoritarian culture caused authoritarian
governmentality, but also contributed to project failure through poor
decision-making. So there was correlation but not causality. On LASCAD
4, the liberal and neo-liberal governmentality contribute to good
decision-making within the Golden Circle, and so did contribute to
project-success. On the Amsterdam NS Line, the governance structure
was changed from a principle-agency relationship to a stewardship
relationship, and a culture based on trust rather than control. That led to
improvements in decision-making in many ways, but particularly in the
relationship with external stakeholders. On the Swedish rail tunnel, the
project organization was chosen using naturalistic decision making. The
neo-liberal governmentality at the top of the project did not directly in-
fluence the naturalistic decision-making, but created a context which
enabled it to happen. So there was no direct interaction between the
governmentality and the naturalistic decision making, but the
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which naturalistic decision-making could occur. On the two organiza-
tional change projects there was a strong interaction between gov-
ernmentality and culture. The neo-liberal and liberal governmentality
created a culture within which both projects could flourish, but it was ore
the culture that influenced the other five psychological constructs. Also
with ABS International, as we saw, the choosing of achievable project
objectives, helped create a culture oriented to success, and on the CRM
implementation managing the project as a PSO project created a culture
oriented to success.
Answering RQ2, somewhat unsurprisingly, the six psychological
constructs do influence decision making, and thence project success.
Psychological theory would strongly suggest that, (Reader, 2019).
Table 4 shows the influence.
Answering RQ3, in all case studies except LASCAD 1, 2 & 3, good
governance created a context in which good project management could
thrive, and appointed competent people to positions of responsibility or
authority who took good decisions. In CTAK, the people assigned to the
Golden Circle used prototyping to reach a good solution. On the
Amsterdam metro, people in responsible positions decided a governance
structure based on stewardship and trust would be preferable to one
based on principal-agency and control. In the Swedish rail tunnel, a
competent project director chose a successful project organization. And
in ABS International and the Customer Relationship management Sys-
tem, competent project leaders created successful projects.
I wish to finish this discussion with two issues suggested by Table 2.
The first is whether project performance is caused by governmentality
and governance or by leadership and management. Again, gov-
ernmentality and governance could influence leadership and manage-
ment, or leadership and management could influence governmentality
and governance. On the Swedish rail tunnel, the use of naturalistic de-
cision making to choose the project organization illustrated good lead-
ership, but as we said above, perhaps the neo-liberal governmentality
allowed the leadership to flourish. Similarly, on the two organizational
change projects, the management of the team implementing showedTable 4
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good leadership by the core project team. Did good leadership or good
governmentality contribute to project success? I think good leadership
contributed directly, bit again I think the liberal and neo-liberal gov-
ernmentality allowed good leadership to flourish. Dean (2010) would
suggest that governmentality comes first.
The second is the tension between individual and society, between
human agency and structure, topics much covered in the psychological
literature, (Furnham, 2005; Haslam, 2004). In the discussion above,
governmentality features more than governance. Perhaps because, as
Dean (2010) suggests, governmentality sets the scene for governance,
leadership and management. But decisions are taken by people, human
agents, and so perhaps it is governmentality and not governance that
influences decision-making. With the Amsterdam metro, it was gover-
nance that influenced decision making and performance, but with the
five other projects it was governmentality. Müller Pemsel et al. (2015)
invoke Institutional Theory, (Scott, 2004), to elaborate the tension be-
tween individuals and societies or organizations. Institutions comprise
actors, (humans and organizations), and become real through the actors’
behaviours, (Scott, 2012). Müller Pemsel et al. (2015) identify three
pillars of institutional theory: regulative elements; normative elements;
and cultural-cognitive elements. We saw regulative elements in ABS In-
ternational, with the guidelines issued by the EU about the nature of
project objectives. In LASCAD1, 2 and 3, the authoritarian gov-
ernmentality constrained the way people behaved. There were normative
elements in all the projects, with informal norms and values, and formal
and informal roles, which we discussed under identity. Finally the
cultural-cognitive elements were discussed under social representation
and were significant in CTAK, ABS International and the CRM
implementation.
6.1. Theoretical implications
Authors on project governance suggest good project governance leads
to good project performance, but they say the link is unknown. Turner



























































R. Turner Project Leadership and Society 1 (2020) 100003may lead to good decision making which leads to good project perfor-
mance. He suggested governance may influence six psychological con-
structs which will influence decision making. Turner cautioned that
correlation does not prove causality. With one of the six case studies
studied here, inappropriate culture led to poor governance and to poor
decision making and poor project performance, so poor governance and
poor project performance are correlated, but both are caused by inap-
propriate culture. In the other five case studies, good governance led to
good project performance. In all six case studies, the six psychological
constructs influenced decision making. As we have just seen, on LAS-
CAD1,2 & 3, inappropriate culture led to poor governance and poor
decision making. On the other five projects, good governmentality and
governance created an environment in which good decisions could be
made, and assigned competent people to lead the projects take decisions.
Thus this work provides support for Turner’s proposition that the link
from good governance to good project performance is via good decision
making, the six psychological constructs contribute, and good gov-
ernmentality and governance assign competent people to take decisions.
6.2. Practical implications
This work provides guidance to project professionals about how
governance can improve decisionmaking on projects and thence improve
project performance. Work on project governance has shown that good
governance is associated with good performance on projects, and that
often it helps improve project performance. In five of the case studies,
good governance led to improved decision making, which led to
improved project performance. In the case of the Amsterdam metro, the
switch from a governance structure based on principal-agency to one
based on stewardship created a context in which better decision could be
made. Governance based on stewardship leads to better project perfor-
mance, (Joslin and Müller, 2016), and should now be the new normal,
(Collier and Kay, 2020). In four other case studies, governance created an
environment in which good decision could be made and assigned
competent people to project leadership positions to take good decisions.
In the case of the first three attempts at the Computerisation of London
Ambulance the organizational culture influenced governance and deci-
sion making. This illustrates the strong impact culture can have on de-
cision making and project performance raising awareness of the need to
be cognisant of organizational culture.
6.2.1. Limitations
In this paper we have reviewed six case studies, two each from in-
formation systems, construction and organizational change. Information
systems, engineering and organizational change were the three tech-
nologies considered by Müller and Turner (2007), following Crawford
et al. (2006). Crawford et al. suggested that as the basic categorization of
technology, but did suggest wider categorizations, so it would be possible
to find other types of projects. The two information systems projects were
in fact four attempts at the same system, but the behaviour in the fourth
attempt was significantly different from the first three, and so provided a
useful comparison. The six case studies all provided a different
perspective, so saturation was not reached. But the six perspectives all
provided valuable insights. In five of the case studies, governance
influenced decision making which influenced performance. That was in
fact what we were looking for. In the sixth, culture influenced decision
making and separately influenced governance. It might be useful to find
more case studies where the psychological construct is the main influ-
encing factor, but the aim here was to investigate cases where gover-
nance is the main influencing variable.
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